BEIJING : This Dec. 21 story has been corrected to clarify that the ban was on the export of technology to make rare earth magnets and that the ban on technology to extract and separate critical materials was already in place, in paragraphs 1 and 6. It also removes context and the comment on rare earth processi
You obviously fall into the trap of believing that hard science cares about politics, and that money thrown at problems as part of national strategic planning magically solves them. But for anyone else legitimately interested in understanding the topic better and having a glimpse at its complexity, those are great resources:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmgkV83OhHA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Ge2RcvDlgw
If the above is too advanced, this can serve as a good primer and answers “how the heck did we get there”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt9NEnWmyMo
Also, I never wrote that China will never get to EUV (or eventually something beyond that), just that it will take a very long time, because the complexity is spread across several very distinct scientific disciplines, integrating them is a challenge of its own (again, watch the videos), and packaging this into a system that meets the scale and reliability requirements to make it commercially viable hasn’t been reproduced to date.
Your overall point about EUV being difficult isn’t wrong, but this line is really where the typical liberal forecasting of China’s capabilities fall apart: they don’t give a shit about it being commercially viable, they give a shit about having the industrial capacity.
The reason why EUV is more or less a cartel monopoly in the West is that it’s a cobbled together collection of scientific principles that work well enough that the first few companies that figured it out could make insane profits off of it, and then proceeded to patent the shit out of it to prevent anyone else from doing so. The engineering behind EUV is… not great from a reliability standpoint, most notably the fact that EUV has an average downtime of something like 10% (meaning your fabs are offline 10% of the year for maintenance), in large part because you’re shooting little droplets of liquid metals with a high intensity laser which tends to splatter and require cleanup. There are potential alternatives to this process for creating the kind of UV light you need for lithography, such as particle accelerators, that are theoretically superior but the R&D into those alternatives costs tens of billions of dollars with no guarantees that any of it will ever become profitable, so Western capital doesn’t bother trying.
China doesn’t have that profit restriction. It needs the ability to produce bleeding edge chips to remove its reliance on an increasingly hostile West, and it has not only the engineering and scientific power to brute force that kind of R&D but the ability to devote a sizeable portion of its national resources to doing so. It doesn’t matter if its profitable, it matters if they’re able to decouple a critical industry from the West and ignore sanctions accordingly, and that has infinitely more value than a shareholder dividend, so they will put the resources into doing so and, inevitably, they will figure it out. And from what we’ve seen over the past 2 years since the trade wars have started, they’re not only succeeding but doing so ahead of expectations, in large part because increasing tensions have made life a living hell for Chinese scientists and engineers abroad working in these industries due to racism and suspicions of spying which push them to emigrate back to China and lend their expertise there instead.
In 20 years, chips made in mainland China will be competitive or even superior to their Western counterparts unless the West undoes 50 years of neoliberal rot overnight and replicates what the CPC is doing for silicon manufacturing or the CPC collapses and China experiences the same shock doctrine that the former Soviet states did in the 90s, and neither of those outcomes look likely right now.